Changed since version 5

• Source references renumbered: Unit 42 is now S1 (was S6), SecurityWeek S2 (was S3), CISA KEV S3 (was S4), CISA alert S4 (was S5), The Hacker News S5 (was S1), FG-IR-26-122 S6 (was S2).
• Hunt 2 adds /acme/order/ and /acme/authz/ paths and the 47.18.167.159:8085/pM.js download [S1].
• Verify adds the sniffer port list, the /data2/template/ drop path, the mod_md job.json reverse-shell check, the YARA rule name, and benign look-alikes [S1].
• Added an Eradicate section and re-entry triggers drawn from S1 and S6.
• Timeline added, including the 2026-10-20 SecurityWeek story, flagged as uncorroborated [S2].
• Open questions added on date inconsistency, the uncorroborated SecurityWeek content, and unsourced IPS signature guidance.

What happened

• Unit 42 reports CL-STA-0954 (UNC5820) exploited FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) on a telecom MSP's FortiManager. The actor registered a rogue Virtual FortiGate and created a .tm config archive [S1].
• The actor took configs, credentials and keys for 500+ managed FortiGates. It pushed sniffer configs, and an admin named FortiGateCloud downloaded running configs [S1][S5].
• With cracked credentials the actor opened SSL-VPN sessions, then used the CVE-2025-61624 auto-script path traversal to drop a loader [S1][S5].
• PEERSTITCH ptrace-injects into miglogd and iked to bypass validation on tagged VPN sessions. A mod_md ACME hook gives an SSH reverse shell [S1].
• The actor killed logging daemons, cleared crashlogs, and deleted rogue admins, VPN groups and auto-scripts after use [S1].
• CISA added CVE-2025-61624 to KEV on 2026-10-16. It affects FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager and requires an admin with read-write permissions [S3][S4].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. The ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf objects delivered PEERSTITCH and the reverse shell [S1]. Treat it as likely compromise. The actor deletes these objects after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. Port 8085 fetches of pM.js from 23.240.77.233 or 47.18.167.159 match the component download. Port 8084 /acme/ paths match the mod_md reverse-shell channel [S1]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the host is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crashlogs, or an admin named FortiGateCloud acted on the device. Unit 42 reports all of these as actor tradecraft [S1]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps; a successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The serial or name of the rogue Virtual FortiGate appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S1]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you; the actor may use other serials.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../, sniffer configs on TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389, and admins or VPN groups created then deleted [S1].
• Run 'diagnose debug crashlog read' and look for Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd [S1].
• With vendor support, check miglogd and iked memory maps for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions and the NOP patches Unit 42 lists [S1].
• Look for files under /data2/template/ (pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js, dd) and for index.js, index.wasm, ipssem.js and lldprx [S1].
• Check /tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf and the mod_md job.json for kali@23.240.77.233:8084 or /bin/node as a challenge handler [S1].
• Scan file and memory images with the Unit 42 YARA rule u42_apt_linux_PEERSTITCH_fortigate_implant and compare against the published SHA-256 hashes [S1].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S4][S6]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624: the attacker is authenticated with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S4]
• In this campaign, that access came from credentials taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1]

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S6]. Fixed versions are not stated in the provided material.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, any unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and which FortiGates it manages.
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions.
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, RADIUS/LDAP binds.
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and which hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from.
• Log retention per device, and gaps in syslog delivery.

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crashlogs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked. PEERSTITCH lives in process memory; a reboot destroys those artifacts and cannot be undone [S1].
• Block 23.240.77.233, 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 at egress and for SSL-VPN [S1].
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless required [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts, since the actor impersonated FortiManager [S1]. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S1].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Data already taken stays exposed after rotation.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 [S6] and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, FG-IR-26-122 cites FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) [S6]; confirm it is in place.

Eradicate

• Remove auto-script objects with traversal names, and files under /data2/template/ and /tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S1].
• Reset the mod_md config so no challenge handler points to /bin/node [S1].
• Clear injected miglogd and iked code by restarting or reimaging from patched firmware, after evidence capture [S1][S6].
• Remove rogue Virtual FortiGate registrations, rogue admins, VPN groups and sniffer configs [S1].

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S6].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crashlogs are retained.
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1].

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with fixed versions or new affected products [S6].
• New campaign IPs, hashes or file names are published [S1].
• A hunt hits on any FortiGate not managed by a FortiManager already in scope.
• Evidence emerges that PEERSTITCH survives a reboot or firmware update.
• CISA or Fortinet ties CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 to this campaign.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured, and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Gap: no fixed versions in the provided material.
• Gap: roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 are not explained; one story calls CVE-2024-26008 an alias of FortiJump, which the sources do not support [S2].
• Gap: whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot is not stated.
• Gap: mapping of SHA-256 hashes to individual component files is not given.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 00:49Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 4 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 00:49Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• Dates are inconsistent: the brief is dated 2026-10-15 and marks the 10-15 story as today, yet stories run to 10-20 and the KEV listing is 10-16. Which date is current?
• SecurityWeek's linked page reportedly returned unrelated content; its claims, including the CVE-2024-26008 alias, are uncorroborated [S2].
• Guidance citing Palo Alto Threat Prevention signatures 95788 and 96788 for CVE-2024-47575 has no source attached; not used.
• Which fixed versions resolve CVE-2025-61624 per product?
• Is the 47.18.167.159 pM.js URL a mirror of the same payload as the 23.240.77.233 URL?

Sources

• [S1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/fortimanager-cve-2024-47575-peerstitch-malware/ · Unit 42
• [S2] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S3] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S6] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.