Changed since version 17

• Source references renumbered to this brief's list: Unit 42 is now S1 (the prior cited it as S6 without listing it), SecurityWeek S2, CISA KEV S3, CISA alert S4, The Hacker News S5, FortiGuard S6.
• Technical claims previously cited to The Hacker News now cite Unit 42 directly where its text confirms them [S1].
• Verify: added Unit 42 YARA rule u42_apt_linux_PEERSTITCH_fortigate_implant [S1].
• Verify: added a note that the brief's seven SHA-256 hashes need source confirmation, and a benign look-alike line.
• Eradicate and re-enter sections filled from Unit 42 and FortiGuard [S1][S6].
• Timeline added, including the 2026-10-20 SecurityWeek report that the pipeline could not read [S2].
• Open questions added: brief date inconsistency, unsourced Palo Alto signature IDs, unattributed hashes.

What happened

• The actor exploited FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) on a telecom MSP's FortiManager and registered a rogue Virtual FortiGate named localhost (serial FMG-VMTM23017412) [S1].
• It generated a .tm config archive and took configs, credentials and keys for 500+ managed FortiGates. It also pushed unauthorized sniffer configs to downstream FortiGates [S1][S5].
• With cracked credentials it opened SSL-VPN sessions from external staging infrastructure [S1].
• It abused CVE-2025-61624 through auto-script objects named ../../../../setup to gain root and drop PEERSTITCH, which ptrace-injects into /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked [S1]. CISA added CVE-2025-61624 to KEV on 2026-10-16 [S4].
• It used Apache mod_md (MDChallengeDns01 mapped to /bin/node) to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• It killed miglogd and syslogd, cleared crash logs, and deleted rogue admins, VPN groups and auto-scripts after use [S1].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S1]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes auto-scripts after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. A pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js or dd fetch from 23.240.77.233:8085 matches the component download into /data2/template/ [S1]. Port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S1]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crash logs, matching the actor's killall -9 miglogd/syslogd and crashlog clear [S1]. An admin named FortiGateCloud pulling running configs over FGFM matches the actor [S1]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps. A successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate serial or name appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S1]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you, since the actor may use other serials. The bare .tm term is noisy, so confirm by context.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../ and for admins or VPN groups that were created then deleted [S1].
• Run diagnose debug crashlog read. Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd are a reported indicator [S1].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence does not clear a device [S5]. Check /data2/template/ for leftover components such as lldprx, ipssem.js and index.wasm [S1].
• Scan recovered files and memory images with Unit 42's YARA rule u42_apt_linux_PEERSTITCH_fortigate_implant. Its strings include /bin/miglogd, /bin/iked, 169.254.0.1, /tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf and /proc/%d/mem [S1].
• Review SSL-VPN sessions that authenticated without the expected validation steps. Hooked iked lets tagged sessions bypass validation [S1].
• Check the Apache mod_md job.json for MDChallengeDns01 mapped to /bin/node, or entries like kali@23.240.77.233:8084 with -F /tmp/upfile/ssh_config [S1].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S4][S6]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624 requires an authenticated attacker with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S4].
• In this campaign, that access followed credentials and keys taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1].

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S6]. Fixed versions are not stated in the provided material.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and the FortiGates it manages [S1].
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions [S1].
• Sniffer configs on FortiGates, especially those capturing TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S1].
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, RADIUS/LDAP binds.
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and the hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from, since the actor used FGFM to pull configs [S1].

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crash logs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked, where PEERSTITCH runs [S1]. A reboot destroys in-memory artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233, 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 at egress and for SSL-VPN [S1].
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless it is required. The actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S1].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Rotation does not undo exposure of data already taken.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S6].

Eradicate

• Remove auto-script objects with traversal names and the files they dropped under /data2/template/ [S1].
• Remove the mod_md config abuse: MDChallengeDns01 mapped to /bin/node and /tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S1].
• Clear PEERSTITCH from miglogd and iked memory only after evidence capture, then reflash or upgrade to fixed firmware with vendor guidance [S1][S6].
• Remove the rogue Virtual FortiGate registration and close the FortiJump root cause on FortiManager [S1].

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S6].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crash logs are retained [S1].
• Confirm no 16KB rwxp regions remain in miglogd and iked, and the YARA rule finds nothing [S1].
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1].

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with fixed versions, new affected products or new indicators [S6].
• Unit 42 or another primary source publishes new infrastructure, hashes or traversal object names [S1].
• A hunt hit appears on a FortiManager, which puts every managed FortiGate in scope [S1].
• CISA adds CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 to KEV [S3].
• The SecurityWeek report becomes readable and adds facts not in Unit 42 [S2].

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: the provided material does not state fixed versions.
• Gap: the sources do not explain the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009. One summary calls CVE-2024-26008 a FortiJump alias, but the pipeline could not read that source [S2].
• Gap: the sources do not say whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 07:59Z from public sources: 17 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 1 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 4 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 07:59Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• Date inconsistency: the brief is dated 2026-10-15 and marks that story as today, yet other stories are dated 2026-10-16 to 2026-10-20 and the KEV addition is 2026-10-16. Confirm the thread order and brief date.
• Published guidance lists Palo Alto Threat Prevention signatures 95788 and 96788 for CVE-2024-47575 with no source; not used in the card.
• The source of the seven SHA-256 hashes and the 'index.js' component in the evidence samples is not attributed; confirm against Unit 42.
• Fixed versions for CVE-2025-61624 across the four products.
• Whether PEERSTITCH persists across reboot or firmware upgrade.
• Roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 in the chain.

Sources

• [S1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/fortimanager-cve-2024-47575-peerstitch-malware/ · Unit 42
• [S2] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S3] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S6] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.