Changed since version 24

• Renumbered sources to match today's list: The Hacker News is now S1, FortiGuard S2, SecurityWeek S3, CISA KEV S4 and CISA alert S5. Unit 42 is carried from v24 as S6. Citations were updated throughout.
• Scope only_if: added that CVE-2025-61624 lets the attacker write or delete arbitrary files via specific CLI commands [S4][S5].
• Verify: added the iked tag-based validation bypass, so VPN sessions on an injected device should be treated as unvalidated [S1].
• Verify: added benign look-alikes.
• Timeline: added SecurityWeek's 2026-10-20 coverage. Its page was unreadable, so it corroborates nothing [S3].
• Open questions: added the unconfirmed 8550 / 169.254.0.1 markers, and the need to recheck Unit 42 details now absent from the source list.
• Added Eradicate, Re-enter and Coverage checks sections.

What happened

• CL-STA-0954 (aka UNC5820) gained initial access to a telecom MSP through FortiManager flaw FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) [S1][S6].
• The actor exfiltrated running configs, cryptographic material and database files for more than 500 managed FortiGates [S1].
• Stolen credentials were used for unauthorized SSL/VPN sessions to perimeter firewalls [S1].
• The actor exploited CVE-2025-61624, which lets an authenticated read-write admin write or delete arbitrary files via CLI commands, to deploy PEERSTITCH [S1][S4][S5].
• PEERSTITCH is an ARM64 injector delivered by an auto-script from 23.240.77.233:8085. It ptrace-injects into /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked, and tagged VPN sessions bypass FortiOS validation [S1].
• The actor killed syslog, cleared crash logs, deleted rogue admins and auto-scripts after use, and used Apache mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S6]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes auto-scripts after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. A fetch of pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js or dd from port 8085 matches the component download [S1][S6]. Port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S6]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1][S6]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crash logs, which matches the actor's log tampering [S1]. An admin named FortiGateCloud pulling running configs over FGFM matches the FortiManager impersonation [S1][S6]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps. A successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate (localhost, serial FMG-VMTM23017412) appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S6]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you, because the actor may use other serials. The bare .tm term is noisy, so confirm by context.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../ and for admins or VPN groups that were created and then deleted [S1][S6].
• Run diagnose debug crashlog read. Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd are a reported indicator [S6].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence does not clear a device [S1]. Check /data2/template/ for leftover lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js and index.wasm [S6].
• Hash recovered files and compare them with Unit 42's published SHA-256 values. Scan with Unit 42's YARA rule u42_apt_linux_PEERSTITCH_fortigate_implant [S6].
• Inspect Apache mod_md job.json for MDChallengeDns01 mapped to /bin/node. Also look for SSH arguments such as kali@23.240.77.233:8084 with -F /tmp/upfile/ssh_config [S6].
• Check /proc/<pid>/maps of /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions [S6]. Audit /proc/<pid>/mem writes between the two processes [S6].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S2][S5]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624 requires an authenticated attacker with an admin profile that has read-write permissions. That attacker can write or delete arbitrary files via specific CLI commands [S4][S5].
• In this campaign, that access followed credentials and keys taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1].

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S2]. The provided material does not state fixed versions.

Enumerate

• List every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager, list all registered devices, unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and the FortiGates it manages [S6].
• List all admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions [S1].
• List sniffer configs on FortiGates, especially those capturing TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S6].
• List secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, and RADIUS/LDAP binds [S1].
• Map management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and the hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from [S1][S6].

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crash logs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked, where PEERSTITCH runs [S1]. A reboot destroys in-memory artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233 at egress and for SSL-VPN [S1]. Also block 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 [S6].
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless it is required. The actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S1][S6].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Rotation does not undo exposure of data already taken.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S2].

Eradicate

• Remove rogue admin accounts, VPN groups, auto-script objects and sniffer configs [S1][S6].
• Remove PEERSTITCH components (lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js, index.wasm) and the injected code in miglogd and iked [S1][S6]. Reimaging firmware from a trusted source is the conservative path, since the sources do not state whether the implant persists.
• Remove mod_md configuration abused for reverse shells [S1][S6].
• Close the root cause by patching CVE-2025-61624 and CVE-2024-47575 and rotating all secrets exposed via FortiManager [S1][S2].

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S2].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crash logs are retained [S1].
• Confirm no 16KB rwxp regions remain in miglogd and iked, and that the published YARA rule finds nothing [S6].
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1].

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with fixed versions, new affected products or a changed exploitation status [S2].
• New IoCs or campaign IPs are published beyond those in Unit 42's report [S6].
• CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 is confirmed as part of the chain, or is added to KEV [S4].
• A hunt hits on any FortiGate, which puts its managing FortiManager and peer devices in scope [S1].
• Evidence shows PEERSTITCH survives a reboot or firmware upgrade.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: the provided material does not state fixed versions.
• Gap: the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 are unexplained. One story calls CVE-2024-26008 a FortiJump alias, but SecurityWeek's linked content could not be read [S3].
• Gap: the sources do not say whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 13:07Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 7 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 13:07Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• Is CVE-2024-26008 an alias for FortiJump, as one story claims, or a separate flaw? What role does CVE-2024-26009 play?
• Which FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager versions fix CVE-2025-61624?
• Does PEERSTITCH persist across reboot or firmware upgrade?
• The pipeline's behavior notes cite VPN traffic markers 8550 and 169.254.0.1 for the iked bypass. The quoted source text does not show these values, so they need confirmation in Unit 42's report before use as a hunt.
• Unit 42's report is not in today's source list. Details cited to [S6] are carried from prior draft v24 and should be rechecked against the primary report.
• Are victims beyond the single telecom MSP known?

Sources

• [S1] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S2] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs
• [S3] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.