Changed since version 9

• Renumbered sources to this thread. Unit 42 is now S1 and listed as a source. SecurityWeek is S2, CISA KEV S3, the CISA alert S4, The Hacker News S5 and FortiGuard S6. Citations were re-attributed to Unit 42 where its text is quoted [S1].
• Hunt 2: added port 8084 /directory and /acme/ URLs, and 47.18.167.159:8085/pM.js [S1].
• Verify: added lldprx, ipssem.js, index.wasm and /data2/template/ artifacts, the mod_md job.json SSH config, the Unit 42 YARA rule and SHA-256 hashes, and benign look-alikes [S1].
• Eradicate: added the md-acme.conf auto-script, /data2/template/ files and the mod_md SSH config [S1].
• Confidence reason: noted that the SecurityWeek story's linked page returned unrelated content, so it adds no corroboration [S2].
• Timeline: added the Unit 42 publication, the KEV due date and SecurityWeek coverage [S1][S3][S2].
• Open questions: added the date inconsistency and the unsourced PAN signature IDs.

What happened

• CL-STA-0954 (UNC5820) exploited FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) on a telecom MSP's FortiManager and registered a rogue Virtual FortiGate named localhost, serial FMG-VMTM23017412 [S1].
• The actor generated a .tm configuration archive and exfiltrated configs, credentials and keys for 500+ managed FortiGates. It also pushed unauthorized sniffer configs to downstream FortiGates [S1].
• Using stolen credentials, it opened SSL-VPN sessions from staging infrastructure. It then abused CVE-2025-61624 through auto-script objects with path traversal names such as ../../../../setup [S1][S5].
• The setup script downloaded five files from 23.240.77.233:8085 into /data2/template/. PEERSTITCH ptrace-injects into miglogd and iked so tagged VPN sessions bypass validation [S1].
• Apache mod_md was abused, with MDChallengeDns01 mapped to /bin/node, to open an SSH reverse shell. The actor killed logging daemons, cleared crashlogs, and deleted rogue admins, VPN groups and auto-scripts after use [S1].
• CISA added CVE-2025-61624 to KEV on 2026-10-16. The bug lets an authenticated read-write admin write or delete arbitrary files via CLI commands [S4].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S1]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes these objects after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. Fetches on port 8085 match the component download from 23.240.77.233 or 47.18.167.159 [S1]. Port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S1]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone ran killall -9 on miglogd or syslogd, or cleared crashlogs. Unit 42 reports all three as actor tradecraft. It also reports an admin named FortiGateCloud downloading running configs over FGFM [S1]. Check each device's syslog stream for gaps as well. A successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate serial or name appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S1]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you; the actor may use other serials.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../, and for admins or VPN groups that were created then deleted [S1].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence on disk does not clear a device [S5].
• Look for unexpected sniffer configs targeting TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, UDP 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S1].
• Run 'diagnose debug crashlog read' and look for Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd [S1].
• With vendor support, inspect /proc/<pid>/maps of miglogd and iked for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions. Audit open/write on /proc/<pid>/mem between them [S1].
• With vendor support, check text at base+0x106F7B8, 0x1072E20 and 0x109A570 for NOP patches (0xAA0003E0) [S1].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S4][S6]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624: the attacker is authenticated with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S4]
• In this campaign, that access came from credentials taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1]

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S6]. Fixed versions are not stated in the provided material.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, any unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and which FortiGates it manages.
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions.
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, RADIUS/LDAP binds.
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and which hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from.
• VPN sessions on each FortiGate since first suspected access, compared against expected users and sources.

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crashlogs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked. PEERSTITCH lives in process memory [S1]. A reboot destroys those artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233, 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 at egress and for SSL-VPN [S1].
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless required. The actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts, since the actor impersonated FortiManager [S5]. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S1].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Data already taken stays exposed after rotation.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 [S6] and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S6].

Eradicate

• Remove traversal-named auto-script objects, including ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S1].
• Remove files under /data2/template/ and the mod_md job.json SSH config pointing to 23.240.77.233:8084, with vendor support [S1].
• Clear injected code in miglogd and iked with vendor support. Whether a restart alone suffices is not stated.
• Remove rogue Virtual FortiGate registrations and .tm archives from FortiManager [S1].
• Close the root cause: patch CVE-2024-47575 and CVE-2025-61624, and invalidate all stolen credentials and keys [S1][S6].

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S6].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crashlogs are retained.
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running [S1]. Alert on:
• New auto-scripts, short-lived admins and sniffer config changes.
• Outbound SSH from firewalls and unexpected FGFM peers.
• Unexpected VPN sessions and logging gaps.

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with fixed versions, new affected products or workarounds.
• New IoCs, hashes or staging IPs are published for CL-STA-0954 / PEERSTITCH.
• Evidence emerges that PEERSTITCH persists across reboot or firmware upgrade.
• A hunt hits on any FortiGate or FortiManager, or a logging gap is found on a device.
• CISA or Fortinet ties CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 to exploitation in this campaign.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured, and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: no fixed versions in the provided material.
• Gap: the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 are not explained. One story calls CVE-2024-26008 an alias of FortiJump, which the sources do not support [S2].
• Gap: whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot is not stated.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 02:41Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 6 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 02:41Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• Date inconsistency: the brief is dated 2026-10-15 and that story is marked today, yet other stories are dated 2026-10-16 to 2026-10-20 and CISA's KEV addition is 2026-10-16. Which date is current?
• The SecurityWeek story [S2] says its only linked source returned unrelated content. Is S2 a valid source for this campaign?
• PAN Threat Prevention signatures 95788 and 96788 for CVE-2024-47575 appear in guidance with no source attached. These are unverified and are left out of the card.
• Does CVE-2024-26008 relate to FortiJump, as one story claims, or is it a separate issue?
• What are the fixed versions for CVE-2025-61624 per FG-IR-26-122?

Sources

• [S1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/fortimanager-cve-2024-47575-peerstitch-malware/ · Unit 42
• [S2] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S3] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S6] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.