Changed since version 14

• Renumbered sources to this run's list: THN is now S1, FortiGuard S2, SecurityWeek S3, CISA KEV S4, CISA alert S5. Unit 42 is retained as S6 for details only it states.
• Added a verify step for iked tagged-session markers (8550 / 169.254.0.1), the new vendor-stated behavior [S1].
• Added index.js to the component files to compare and remove [S1].
• Added the KEV federal due date of 2026-10-19 to the timeline [S4].
• Added the 2026-10-20 story to the timeline, noting its link returned unrelated content [S3].
• Added open questions on the conflicting FortiManager root-access claim and on Unit 42 not being in the current source set.
• Filled the eradicate, reenter_when and coverage_checks sections.

What happened

• The actor got initial access by exploiting FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) on a telecom MSP's FortiManager [S1].
• It exfiltrated running configs, cryptographic material and database files for 500+ managed FortiGates [S1].
• It used the stolen material for unauthorized SSL/VPN sessions to perimeter firewalls [S1].
• It exploited CVE-2025-61624 to deploy PEERSTITCH [S1]. CISA added CVE-2025-61624 to KEV on 2026-10-16 [S5].
• An auto-script downloads five components from 23.240.77.233:8085 [S1].
• PEERSTITCH ptrace-injects into /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked. Tagged VPN sessions then skip FortiOS security validation [S1].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S6]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes auto-scripts after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. Fetches of pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js or dd from 23.240.77.233:8085 match the component download [S1]. The other IPs and the port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S6]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1][S6]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crash logs. That matches the reported syslog termination and crash-log clearing [S1]. An admin named FortiGateCloud pulling running configs matches the actor's FortiManager impersonation [S1][S6]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps. A successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate serial or name appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S6]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you, since the actor may use other serials. The bare .tm term is noisy, so confirm by context.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../ and for admins or VPN groups that were created then deleted [S1][S6].
• Run diagnose debug crashlog read. Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd are a reported indicator [S6].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence does not clear a device [S1]. Check /data2/template/ for leftover components [S6].
• With vendor support, inspect /proc/<pid>/maps of /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions [S6].
• Check text at base+0x106F7B8, 0x1072E20 and 0x109A570 for 0xAA0003E0 patches [S6].
• Audit open/write on /proc/<pid>/mem between miglogd and iked [S6].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S2][S5]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624 requires an authenticated attacker with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S5].
• In this campaign, that access followed credentials and keys taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1].

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S2]. Fixed versions are not stated in the provided material.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and the FortiGates it manages.
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions.
• Sniffer configs on FortiGates, especially those capturing TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S6].
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, RADIUS/LDAP binds.
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and the hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from.

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crash logs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked, where PEERSTITCH runs [S1]. A reboot destroys in-memory artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233 [S1] and 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 [S6] at egress and for SSL-VPN.
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless it is required. The actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S1][S6].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Rotation does not undo exposure of data already taken.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S2].

Eradicate

• Remove injected code from miglogd and iked under vendor guidance. Remove PEERSTITCH components (lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js, index.wasm and others) [S1][S6].
• Remove rogue auto-scripts, admin accounts, VPN groups and sniffer configs [S1][S6].
• Close the root causes: patch CVE-2024-47575 on FortiManager and CVE-2025-61624 on FortiOS and the other affected products [S1][S2].
• Where integrity cannot be confirmed, reimage with vendor-verified firmware and rebuild the config from a known-good baseline.

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S2].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crash logs are retained [S1].
• Confirm no 16KB rwxp regions remain in miglogd and iked [S6].
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1].

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with new affected products, versions or fixed builds [S2].
• CISA or Fortinet ties CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 to this campaign.
• New PEERSTITCH IoCs, hashes or C2 infrastructure are published.
• A hunt hit appears on any FortiManager. Every managed FortiGate is then in scope [S1].
• Evidence shows PEERSTITCH survives a reboot or firmware upgrade.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: the provided material does not state fixed versions.
• Gap: the sources do not explain the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009. Secondary stories call CVE-2024-26008 a FortiJump alias, which the sources do not support.
• Gap: the sources do not say whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 05:37Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 6 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 05:37Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• Unit 42's report (S6) is not in this run's source list. Details sourced only to it need analyst re-verification: the extra IPs, serial FMG-VMTM23017412, YARA rule name, memory offsets and sniffer ports.
• The 2026-10-20 story says CVE-2025-61624 gave root access against FortiManager. The other sources place CVE-2025-61624 on FortiOS and related products. Which is correct?
• The SecurityWeek link (S3) returned unrelated content, so its claims are uncorroborated.
• What are the fixed versions per product in FG-IR-26-122?
• Are CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 related to this campaign?
• What do the 8550 and 169.254.0.1 tag markers mean, and can they be detected in standard VPN logs?

Sources

• [S1] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S2] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs
• [S3] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.