What happened

• Synology warned customers that threat actors are exploiting a vulnerability to target DSM devices running outdated versions [S1].
• The attacks aim to encrypt data and extort ransom; the ransomware is named C3RB3R [S1].
• The report links a November 2024 Synology advisory covering CVE-2024-10441, CVE-2024-50629 and CVE-2024-10445, but Synology has not named which flaw is exploited [S1].
• Reported artifacts are encrypted files with a .L0CK3D extension and a ransom note named read-me3.txt [S1].
• The source gives no count of successful compromises [S1].

Timeline

Detect

C3RB3R ransom note or encrypted file extension · File system / NAS file activity

index=* (file_path="*read-me3.txt" OR file_path="*.L0CK3D") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen dc(file_path) as distinct_files values(user) as user by host | sort - count

A hit means: A file matching the reported C3RB3R ransom note name or encrypted-file extension was written. Many distinct .L0CK3D files on one host within a short window indicates encryption in progress or complete.

Verify

• Open a read-me3.txt hit and confirm it is a ransom demand, not an unrelated file with the same name.
• Check that .L0CK3D files cannot be opened and that originals are missing or renamed.
• Correlate the host with a Synology DSM device and check its DSM version against the fixed builds.
• Benign look-alikes: a user file coincidentally named read-me3.txt; backup or archive tools using a similar extension. Neither produces bulk renames.

Scope

Affected

• Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) outdated versions; patched in November 2024 advisory [S1]

Only if

• Management web interface reachable from the Internet [S1]

Not affected if

• Running patched DSM versions listed by Synology [S1]

Fixed in: DSM 7.2.2-72806-1 or above; DSM 7.2.1-69057-6 or above; DSM 7.2-64570-4 or above; DSM 7.1.1-42962-7 or above; DSM 6.2.4-25556-8 or above [S1; verify against Synology advisory]

Enumerate

• All Synology NAS devices, including shadow IT and branch or lab units, with DSM version and build.
• Which DSM management interfaces are reachable from the internet, including via port forwarding, QuickConnect or reverse proxies.
• Local and domain accounts with DSM admin rights on each device.
• Shares and systems that back up to or mount affected NAS volumes.

Contain

• Remove internet exposure of DSM management interfaces now; this is reversible.
• Isolate any NAS with .L0CK3D files or read-me3.txt from the network while keeping it powered on to preserve evidence.
• Capture DSM logs, connection logs and a copy of the ransom note before making changes.
• Disconnect affected NAS from hosts that mount its shares so encryption cannot spread to mapped volumes.
• Do not wipe, reset or reinitialise a device before evidence is captured; a reset cannot be undone and destroys forensic data.

Eradicate

• Upgrade every DSM device to a fixed build listed by Synology [S1].
• Reset credentials for DSM admin accounts on affected devices; the sources do not describe persistence, so treat any unknown accounts, tasks or packages as suspect.

Recover

• Restore from backups verified to predate encryption and stored off the affected device.
• Confirm the DSM build is patched and the management interface is not internet-reachable before reconnecting.
• Monitor for new .L0CK3D files or read-me3.txt notes after restore.

Re-enter the loop when

• Synology names the exploited CVE or publishes a new advisory.
• New C3RB3R IoCs (IPs, hashes, note variants, extensions) are published.
• Attacks are reported against patched DSM builds or other Synology products.
• A NAS not in the original inventory is found exposed or encrypted.

Debrief

• Record DSM inventory, versions and exposure at time of warning, and time to patch each device.
• Record how any exposed interface became internet-reachable.
• Gap: exploited CVE not named by Synology.
• Gap: no initial-access IoCs, network indicators or success counts in the source.
• Gap: patch date given as December 2024 against a November 2024 advisory.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-03 09:07Z from public sources: 11 published, 34 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-10441

vuln:CVE-2024-50629

vuln:CVE-2024-10445

host.services: (software.product = "Synology DSM")

http.component:"Synology DiskStation"

http.title:"DiskStation"

http.title:"Synology DiskStation"

http.html:"DiskStation Manager"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD has not published CPE configurations for these CVEs yet, so only the CVE query is exact; the product queries use the name the campaign gives (Synology DiskStation Manager, Synology DSM) and are replaced by NVD's spelling at the daily re-check once it names the software.

Also tried under the name the card uses, nothing matched on Shodan: product:"Synology DiskStation Manager", http.component:"Synology DiskStation Manager", product:"Synology DSM", http.component:"Synology DSM", host.services: (software.product = "Synology DiskStation Manager").

Banner spellings: a model read 3 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 3 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-03 09:07Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• Which CVE is exploited? Synology has not named it [S1].
• Was the flaw patched in November or December 2024? The source states both.
• Are the fixed_in builds the remediation for the exploited flaw, or only for the three linked CVEs?
• What initial-access indicators (IPs, request paths, ports) exist?
• How many devices have been compromised?
• Has Synology published the warning as a primary advisory we can cite directly?

Sources

• [S1] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synology-warns-customers-of-ongoing-c3rb3r-ransomware-attacks/ · BleepingComputer

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.