Changed since version 20

• Renumbered sources to today's list: The Hacker News is now S1, FortiGuard S2, SecurityWeek S3, CISA KEV S4, CISA alert S5; Unit 42 carried over as S6.
• Added a verify step for iked VPN sessions bypassing validation, from the new vendor-stated behavior (tagged sessions, 8550 / 169.254.0.1 markers) [S1].
• Added 2026-10-20 SecurityWeek report to the timeline and noted its linked content was unreadable, so it adds no corroboration [S3].
• Added eradicate, re-enter triggers and coverage checks sections, sourced to existing material [S1][S2][S6].

What happened

• The actor exploited FortiManager FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) at a telecom MSP for initial access [S1][S6].
• It exfiltrated running configs, cryptographic material and databases covering more than 500 managed FortiGates [S1][S6].
• It used the stolen material for unauthorized SSL/VPN sessions and exploited CVE-2025-61624 to deploy PEERSTITCH [S1].
• An auto-script downloaded five components from 23.240.77.233:8085. PEERSTITCH ptrace-injects into /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked [S1].
• Hooked iked takes an alternative path for tagged VPN sessions, bypassing default FortiOS validations [S1].
• The actor used Apache mod_md for SSH reverse shells, impersonated FortiManager to pull configs, stopped syslog and cleared crash logs [S1][S6].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S6]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes auto-scripts after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1][S6].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. A pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js or dd fetch from port 8085 matches the component download [S1][S6]. Port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S6]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S6]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crash logs, matching the actor's log tampering [S1][S6]. An admin named FortiGateCloud pulling running configs over FGFM matches the FortiManager impersonation [S6]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps; a successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate (localhost, serial FMG-VMTM23017412) appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S6]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you; the actor may use other serials. The bare .tm term is noisy, so confirm by context.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../ and for admins or VPN groups created and then deleted [S1][S6].
• Run diagnose debug crashlog read. Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd are a reported indicator [S6].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence does not clear a device [S1]. Check /data2/template/ for leftover lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js and index.wasm [S6].
• Check /proc/<pid>/maps of /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions. Check text at base+0x106F7B8, 0x1072E20 and 0x109A570 for 0xAA0003E0 patches. Audit /proc/<pid>/mem writes between the two processes [S6].
• Review VPN/IKE logs for sessions that skipped normal validation. The pipeline's extraction from [S1] associates tagged sessions with 8550 and 169.254.0.1 markers; confirm the exact meaning against the Unit 42 report before relying on it.
• Scan recovered files and memory images with Unit 42's YARA rule u42_apt_linux_PEERSTITCH_fortigate_implant [S6].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S5][S2]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1][S6]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1][S6]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624 requires an authenticated attacker with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S5].
• In this campaign, that access followed credentials and keys taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1][S6].

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S2]. The provided material does not state fixed versions.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and the FortiGates it manages [S6].
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions [S1][S6].
• Sniffer configs on FortiGates, especially those capturing TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S6].
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, RADIUS/LDAP binds [S1][S6].
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and the hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from [S1][S6].

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crash logs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked, where PEERSTITCH runs [S1][S6]. A reboot destroys in-memory artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233, 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 at egress and for SSL-VPN [S1][S6].
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless required; the actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S6].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1][S6]. Rotation does not undo exposure of data already taken.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S2].

Eradicate

• Remove rogue auto-scripts, admins, VPN groups, sniffer configs and rogue Virtual FortiGate registrations [S1][S6].
• Remove PEERSTITCH components (lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js, index.wasm) and in-memory injection from miglogd and iked, with vendor guidance [S1][S6].
• Close the root cause: patch CVE-2024-47575 on FortiManager and CVE-2025-61624 per FG-IR-26-122 [S1][S2].

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S2].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crash logs are retained [S6].
• Confirm no 16KB rwxp regions remain in miglogd and iked and the YARA rule finds nothing [S6].
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1][S6].

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with fixed versions, new affected products or new indicators [S2].
• Unit 42 or another primary source publishes new IoCs, serials or C2 addresses [S6].
• A source clarifies the role of CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 in the chain.
• Any hunt hits on a FortiGate, or a FortiManager is found compromised, widening scope to all managed devices [S1].
• A source states whether PEERSTITCH survives reboot or firmware upgrade.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: the provided material does not state fixed versions.
• Gap: the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 are unexplained. SecurityWeek's summary calls CVE-2024-26008 a FortiJump alias, but its linked content could not be read [S3].
• Gap: the sources do not say whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 09:49Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 4 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 09:49Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• SecurityWeek's linked page returned unrelated content; its claims are uncorroborated [S3].
• What do the 8550 and 169.254.0.1 markers on tagged iked sessions mean exactly? They appear in the pipeline's extraction from [S1], not in a quoted passage.
• The Unit 42 report (S6) is carried from the prior draft and is not in today's source list; the analyst should confirm it remains reachable.
• Which fixed versions does FG-IR-26-122 list?
• What roles do CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 play?
• Does PEERSTITCH persist across reboot or firmware upgrade?

Sources

• [S1] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S2] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs
• [S3] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.