Changed since version 16

• Renumbered references to match today's source list: The Hacker News is S1, FortiGuard S2, SecurityWeek S3, CISA KEV catalog S4, CISA alert S5; Unit 42 kept as S6 for details only it carries.
• Added a Verify step for SSL/VPN sessions bypassing validation via hooked iked, from the newly extracted vendor-stated behavior [S1].
• Added open question on the 8550 / 169.254.0.1 tagged-session markers, which lack a quoted source.
• Added FortiManager impersonation to what_happened and the FGFM enumerate item [S1].
• Added a timeline, eradicate steps, re-entry triggers and coverage checks.

What happened

• CL-STA-0954 (aka UNC5820) gained initial access to a telecom MSP's FortiManager through FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) [S1].
• The actor exfiltrated running configs, cryptographic material and database files covering more than 500 managed FortiGates [S1].
• The actor set up unauthorized SSL/VPN sessions to perimeter firewalls and impersonated FortiManager to pull configs from other firewalls [S1].
• The actor exploited CVE-2025-61624, an authenticated FortiOS CLI path traversal, to deploy PEERSTITCH via an auto-script fetching five components from 23.240.77[.]233:8085 [S1][S5].
• PEERSTITCH ptrace-injects into /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked. In iked it lets tagged VPN sessions bypass default FortiOS validation [S1].
• The actor killed logging, cleared crash logs, deleted rogue admins and auto-scripts after use, and spawned SSH reverse shells via Apache mod_md [S1].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S6]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes auto-scripts after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. A pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js or dd fetch from 23.240.77.233:8085 matches the component download [S1]; 47.18.167.159:8085 is a further download host per Unit 42 [S6]. Port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S6]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1][S6]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crash logs, matching the reported syslog termination and crash log clearing [S1][S6]. An admin named FortiGateCloud pulling running configs matches the actor's activity [S6]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps. A successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate serial or name appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S6]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you, since the actor may use other serials. The bare .tm term is noisy, so confirm by context.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../ and for admins or VPN groups that were created then deleted [S1][S6].
• Run diagnose debug crashlog read. Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd are a reported indicator [S6].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence does not clear a device [S1]. Check /data2/template/ for leftover components such as lldprx, ipssem.js and index.wasm [S6].
• Review SSL/VPN sessions that authenticated without the expected validation steps. Hooked iked lets tagged sessions bypass default FortiOS validation [S1].
• Check the Apache mod_md job.json for MDChallengeDns01 mapped to /bin/node, or entries like kali@23.240.77.233:8084 with -F /tmp/upfile/ssh_config [S6].
• With vendor support, inspect /proc/<pid>/maps of /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions, and check for 0xAA0003E0 patches at base+0x106F7B8, 0x1072E20 and 0x109A570 [S6].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S2][S5]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624 requires an authenticated attacker with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S5].
• In this campaign, that access followed credentials and keys taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1].

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S2]. Fixed versions are not stated in the provided material.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and the FortiGates it manages.
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions.
• Sniffer configs on FortiGates, especially those capturing TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S6].
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, RADIUS/LDAP binds.
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and the hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from, since the actor impersonated FortiManager [S1].

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crash logs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked, where PEERSTITCH runs [S1]. A reboot destroys in-memory artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233 [S1] and 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 [S6] at egress and for SSL-VPN.
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless it is required. The actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S6].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Rotation does not undo exposure of data already taken.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S2].

Eradicate

• Remove PEERSTITCH components (pM.js, a.js/index.js, a.wasm/index.wasm, b.js/ipssem.js, dd/lldprx) and any injected code in miglogd and iked [S1][S6].
• Remove rogue auto-scripts, admins, VPN groups and mod_md configuration used for SSH reverse shells [S1][S6].
• Close the root cause: patch CVE-2024-47575 on FortiManager and CVE-2025-61624 on affected products [S1][S2].

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S2].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and crash logs are retained [S1].
• Confirm no 16KB rwxp regions remain in miglogd and iked [S6].
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1][S6].

Re-enter the loop when

• Fortinet updates FG-IR-26-122 with fixed versions, new affected products or a changed workaround [S2].
• New infrastructure IPs or component hashes are published for PEERSTITCH.
• A hit on any hunt, or a syslog gap on a managed FortiGate, which widens scope to its FortiManager and peer devices.
• CISA adds CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 to KEV, or a source explains their role in this chain.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: the provided material does not state fixed versions.
• Gap: the sources do not explain the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009. One summary calls CVE-2024-26008 a FortiJump alias, but the pipeline could not read that source [S3].
• Gap: the sources do not say whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 07:08Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

http.title:"FortiManager"

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 4 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 2 matched something on Shodan and are shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 07:08Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• The pipeline's behavior extraction lists 8550 and 169.254.0.1 as markers of tagged iked VPN sessions; the quoted source text does not show them. Confirm against Unit 42 before hunting on them.
• Which fixed FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager versions resolve CVE-2025-61624?
• Does PEERSTITCH persist across reboot or firmware upgrade?
• What roles do CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009 play, if any?
• The SecurityWeek link returned unrelated content; it is unknown whether it adds detail [S3].

Sources

• [S1] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S2] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs
• [S3] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.