Changed since version 19

• Source numbering changed. Unit 42 is now a direct source [S1], and references were remapped: THN to S5, FortiGuard to S6, SecurityWeek to S2, CISA KEV to S3, CISA alert to S4.
• Confidence reason now cites Unit 42 primary research [S1].
• Hunt 2 hit_means adds 47.18.167.159:8085 as a second pM.js host [S1].
• Verify adds the NOP-patch offsets and /proc/<pid>/mem audit [S1], the seven reported SHA-256 hashes [S1], and benign look-alikes.
• Containment IP blocks are consolidated under Unit 42 [S1].
• Timeline adds the KEV federal due date of 2026-10-19 [S3] and the SecurityWeek report [S2].
• Open questions add the unreadable SecurityWeek link [S2] and the brief date inconsistency.
• Debrief adds the gap that hashes are not mapped to file names [S1].

What happened

• CL-STA-0954 (UNC5820) exploited FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575) on a telecom MSP's FortiManager. It registered a rogue Virtual FortiGate and generated a .tm config archive [S1].
• The actor took configs, credentials and keys for 500+ managed FortiGates and pushed sniffer configs to downstream firewalls [S1].
• Using cracked credentials, the actor opened SSL-VPN sessions. It then abused CVE-2025-61624 auto-script path traversal to reach root [S1][S5].
• PEERSTITCH, an ARM64 ptrace injector, patches miglogd and iked in memory. This lets tagged VPN sessions bypass validation. An Apache mod_md ACME hook gave SSH reverse shells [S1].
• The actor killed logging daemons, cleared crash logs, and deleted rogue admins, VPN groups and auto-scripts after use [S1].
• CISA added CVE-2025-61624 to KEV on 2026-10-16. The flaw affects FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager [S3][S4].

Timeline

Detect

FortiGate auto-script objects with path traversal names · FortiOS system event / config change logs (syslog or FortiAnalyzer forward)

index=* devid=* type="event" subtype="system" (cfgpath="system.auto-script" OR msg="*auto-script*") (cfgobj="*../*" OR msg="*../*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(action) as action values(cfgobj) as cfgobj values(msg) as msg by devname user ui

A hit means: An auto-script object with ../ in its name was created, edited or deleted. Unit 42 names ../../../../setup and ../../tmp/apache2/conf/md-acme.conf [S1]. Treat a hit as likely compromise. The actor deletes auto-scripts after use, so a delete event alone matters [S1].

Traffic, web or SSL-VPN sessions involving campaign infrastructure · FortiGate traffic, web filter and VPN event logs; proxy/egress logs

index=* (srcip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR dstip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR remip IN ("23.240.77.233","47.18.167.159","45.32.41.202","198.199.122.22") OR url="*/pM.js" OR (dstport=8085 (url="*/a.js" OR url="*/a.wasm" OR url="*/b.js" OR url="*/dd")) OR (dstport=8084 (url="*/acme/*" OR url="*/directory")) OR url="*/acme/new-acct*" OR url="*/acme/finalize/*" OR url="*/acme/order/*" OR url="*/acme/authz/*") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dstport) as dstport values(url) as url values(action) as action values(user) as user by devname srcip dstip

A hit means: A device contacted campaign infrastructure. A pM.js, a.js, a.wasm, b.js or dd fetch from port 8085 on 23.240.77.233 or 47.18.167.159 matches the component download [S1]. Port 8084 /directory and /acme/ paths match the mod_md SSH reverse-shell channel [S1]. Inbound SSL-VPN logins from these IPs match stolen-credential use [S1]. ACME paths alone can be benign if the peer is not a campaign IP.

Logging daemons killed, crashlogs cleared, or FortiGateCloud admin activity · FortiOS CLI audit and system event logs

index=* devid=* (msg="*killall*miglogd*" OR msg="*killall*syslogd*" OR msg="*crashlog clear*" OR user="FortiGateCloud") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg values(ui) as ui by devname user

A hit means: Someone stopped logging or cleared crash logs, which matches the actor's log tampering [S1]. An admin named FortiGateCloud pulling running configs over FGFM matches the actor's FortiManager impersonation [S1]. Also check each device's syslog stream for gaps. A successful kill produces silence, not events.

Rogue Virtual FortiGate registration on FortiManager · FortiManager event / device management logs

index=* ("FMG-VMTM23017412" OR ("Virtual FortiGate" AND "localhost") OR ".tm") devid=* | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(msg) as msg by devname

A hit means: The rogue Virtual FortiGate (localhost, serial FMG-VMTM23017412) appears, or a .tm archive is referenced [S1]. Treat the FortiManager and every device it manages as in scope. Absence does not clear you, since the actor may use other serials. The bare .tm term is noisy, so confirm by context.

Verify

• Pull config revisions on each FortiGate. Look for auto-script objects containing ../ and for admins or VPN groups that were created and then deleted [S1].
• Run diagnose debug crashlog read. Signal 11 crashes in miglogd, iked or syslogd are a reported indicator [S1].
• pM.js deletes itself, so its absence does not clear a device [S1]. Check /data2/template/ for leftover components such as lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js and index.wasm [S1].
• Check /proc/<pid>/maps of /bin/miglogd and /bin/iked for anonymous 16,384-byte rwxp regions. Check text at base+0x106F7B8, 0x1072E20 and 0x109A570 for 0xAA0003E0 patches. Audit /proc/<pid>/mem writes between the two processes [S1].
• Scan recovered files and memory images with Unit 42's YARA rule u42_apt_linux_PEERSTITCH_fortigate_implant [S1].
• Compare recovered files against the reported SHA-256 values: 829b1cd270b30565739a478441833f49f10a49bd06f0d18cc96c8ae4a0431f11, 9c4c4436ff5cdf0d6d68f5108031cbf3708a095cde4ef8c09316af7a7110437e, f84eea718526706afdf2d1a2774fab76ecb11c18fb61995a37be8249c5e379ab, b9fb0b27ddd59b58d3ae53c7227298a3e0de1e6f868b9429ae21533bb9cd1e70, bd064244dad748cf2a44074bee56f5bfab4a2b18ee944b75d1b3febd4c1fe02a, fc1b10c58057ef9f1f9a1e2a3d4a1c89f43b0ead451398c70ed7a6e0312b36ee, b7ae166fd49a7ecfe6322a80b8aa56d6aa0825d8f5d106dab2e4fb7d14ce15a8 [S1].

Scope

Affected

• FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager (CVE-2025-61624) [S4][S6]
• FortiManager (CVE-2024-47575), the initial access in this campaign [S1]
• FortiGates managed by a compromised FortiManager, whose configs and keys were exfiltrated [S1]

Only if

• CVE-2025-61624 requires an authenticated attacker with an admin profile that has read-write permissions [S4].
• In this campaign, that access followed credentials and keys taken via the compromised FortiManager [S1].

Not affected if

None stated by the sources.

Fixed in: See Fortinet FG-IR-26-122 [S6]. The provided material does not state fixed versions.

Enumerate

• Every FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager and FortiManager instance, with its running version.
• For each FortiManager: all registered devices, unknown Virtual FortiGates, .tm archives, and the FortiGates it manages [S1].
• All admin accounts, VPN users and groups, including deleted ones visible in config revisions [S1].
• Sniffer configs on FortiGates, especially those capturing TCP 3696-3706, UDP 69, 1812/1813 or TCP 389 [S1].
• Secrets stored in FortiGate configs: admin and VPN credentials, pre-shared keys, certificates, and RADIUS/LDAP binds [S1].
• Management and FGFM (TCP 541) exposure per device, and the hosts each FortiGate accepts management connections from. The actor impersonated FortiManager to pull configs [S1].

Contain

• Before patching or rebooting, export config revisions, event logs and crash logs. With vendor support, capture memory of miglogd and iked, where PEERSTITCH runs [S1]. A reboot destroys in-memory artifacts and cannot be undone.
• Block 23.240.77.233, 47.18.167.159, 45.32.41.202 and 198.199.122.22 at egress and for SSL-VPN [S1].
• Block outbound SSH from firewall management addresses unless it is required. The actor used mod_md to spawn SSH reverse shells [S1].
• Restrict management and FGFM access to known FortiManager and admin hosts. Remove internet exposure of FortiManager and admin interfaces.
• Disable unknown admins and VPN accounts. Remove unauthorized sniffer configs and rogue FortiManager device registrations [S1].
• If a FortiManager may be compromised, rotate every credential and key stored in FortiGate configs [S1]. Rotation does not undo the exposure of data already taken.
• Apply FG-IR-26-122 and the FortiManager fix for CVE-2024-47575. Where patching lags, confirm FortiGuard virtual patch FG-VD-59270.0day (FMWP db 25.120) is in place [S6].

Eradicate

• Remove auto-script objects with traversal names and files under /data2/template/ (lldprx, ipssem.js, index.js, index.wasm, pM.js) [S1].
• Remove the mod_md job.json hook mapping MDChallengeDns01 to /bin/node, and any md-acme.conf cover file [S1].
• Remove the rogue Virtual FortiGate and .tm archives from FortiManager [S1].
• Restart or reflash affected devices only after evidence capture, with vendor guidance. The sources do not state whether PEERSTITCH persists across reboot.

Recover

• Before restoring, confirm patched firmware, a config matching a known-good baseline, and rotated secrets [S6].
• Confirm syslog flows continuously from each device and that crash logs are retained [S1].
• Confirm no 16KB rwxp regions remain in miglogd and iked, and that the YARA rule finds nothing [S1].
• Afterwards, keep the four hunts running. Alert on new auto-scripts, short-lived admins, sniffer config changes, outbound SSH from firewalls, unexpected FGFM peers and logging gaps [S1].

Re-enter the loop when

• New IoCs, hashes or C2 hosts are published beyond the four IPs [S1].
• Fortinet revises FG-IR-26-122, publishes fixed versions, or adds products [S6].
• CISA adds CVE-2024-26008 or CVE-2024-26009 to KEV, or explains their role [S3].
• Any FortiManager in your estate shows a rogue registration or .tm archive. Every managed FortiGate then comes into scope [S1].
• Evidence shows PEERSTITCH survives a reboot, or that victims extend beyond telecom MSPs.

Debrief

• Record each device, version, patch date, evidence captured and hunt results.
• Record which secrets were rotated and when, and any logging gaps found.
• Record VPN sessions that could not be validated, given the iked bypass [S1].
• Gap: the provided material does not state fixed versions.
• Gap: the sources do not explain the roles of CVE-2024-26008 and CVE-2024-26009. One summary calls CVE-2024-26008 a FortiJump alias, but its linked source could not be read [S2].
• Gap: the sources do not say whether PEERSTITCH survives a reboot.

Detection coverage — checked automatically

Checked automatically 2026-11-01 09:11Z from public sources: 18 published, 27 nothing found, 0 not machine-checkable, 0 failed. "Nothing found" means the public source answered and had nothing, as of that moment; a feed covers only its newest posts. Re-checked daily.

Exposure queries — generated automatically

vuln:CVE-2024-47575

vuln:CVE-2024-26008

vuln:CVE-2025-61624

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager"

product:"Fortimanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud"

product:"Fortimanager Cloud"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortimanager Cloud")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiproxy"

product:"Fortiproxy"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiproxy")

cpe:"cpe:/a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager"

product:"Fortiswitchmanager"

host.services: (software.product = "Fortiswitchmanager")

http.title:"FortiProxy"

Internet-wide count, trend

Shodan's count of matching services on the whole internet, one point a day; the scope (your ranges) is never part of it. A count moves with Shodan's crawl as much as with patching, so read the direction, not the digit.

NVD names 2 more affected products (libraries and embedders); the CVE query covers them where Shodan has fingerprinted the version.

Banner spellings: a model read 5 from the NVD names and this card's text (former and marketing names, console titles); 1 matched something on Shodan and is shown above, the rest were dropped.

Scope every query in your own tool, never in a shared document: Shodan `net:<your_ranges>`, `org:"<your_org>"` or `hostname:<your_domain>` (or a Shodan Monitor network alert, which applies the scope for you); Censys `host.ip: <your_ranges>` or `host.dns.names: <your_domain>`. Then compare the banner version with the affected range. Generated automatically 2026-11-01 09:11Z from the CVE ids and NVD's CPE configurations, each Shodan query counted against Shodan itself; re-built daily with the coverage check.

Open questions

• The SecurityWeek link reportedly returned unrelated page content [S2]. Re-fetch it before citing it.
• The brief is dated 2026-10-15, but the thread includes stories dated up to 2026-10-20 and a KEV listing on 2026-10-16. Confirm the brief date.
• Is CVE-2024-26008 an alias of FortiJump? NVD lists it separately, and the sources do not settle this.
• What role, if any, did CVE-2024-26009 play?
• Which fixed versions does FG-IR-26-122 list?
• Does PEERSTITCH persist across reboot or firmware upgrade?
• Unattributed guidance cites NGFW signature IDs for CVE-2024-47575. These are unverified and are not used here.

Sources

• [S1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/fortimanager-cve-2024-47575-peerstitch-malware/ · Unit 42
• [S2] https://www.securityweek.com/exploited-fortinet-bug-linked-to-stealthy-fortigate-implant-in-telecom-hack/ · SecurityWeek
• [S3] https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S4] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog · CISA
• [S5] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-exploit-fortios-flaw-to.html · The Hacker News
• [S6] https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-122 · FortiGuard Labs

Public OSINT only. AI-generated by the pipeline; structure follows the DAIR model from Dynamic Incident Response (Joshua Wright). Published automatically once it crosses the publish bar.